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ABSTRACT: 
Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406) is said to be the first scholar to make history and 
society the direct objects of a systematic science.  This paper will examine the 
role of occasionalism in his thought.  This question is interesting because a 
perennial objection to occasionalism has been that it denies any real natural 
order, and therefore precludes the possibility of any systematic natural science.  
If Ibn Khaldun was an occasionalist, then it would mean that one of the earliest 
pioneers in attempting to apply a systematic scientific method to the study of 
history and society did so on the basis of an occasionalist understanding of 
nature and natural order.  Then the question of whether and how his scientific 
methodology is compatible with occasionalism is of interest for both historical 
and theoretical reasons, in particular for theists who are exploring 
occasionalism as a potential framework for a coherent understanding of the 
natural world (including, in this case, its human and social dimensions) as both 
the manifestation of divine providence and creativity, and as an object of 
systematic empirical science.    
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  I. Introduction 
Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406) is a unique figure in the history of ideas.  He is 
widely viewed to be the first scholar to make history and society the direct 
objects of a systematic science, which he presents in the Muqaddima  (literally, 
the ‘introduction’) to his massive historical work, Kitab al-‘Ibar (‘Book of 
Examples’).  This discipline, which he named the science of human society, 
aims to go beyond mere historical narrative to discover the underlying causes 
and principles governing historical events.  Consequently, the early 
	  	  
development of the modern social sciences in the nineteenth century generated 
a great deal of scholarly interest in Ibn Khaldun that continues today.1                           
 In the modern scholarship on Ibn Khaldun, the question of occasionalism 
arises as part of a wider controversy over the nature of his thought, in particular 
over the proper classification of his ideas according to preconceived categories 
like, “modernity”, “classical philosophy” or “religious dogma.”  There were a 
number of attempts to construe Ibn Khaldun as a kind of proto-“modernist,” in 
the service of a diverse range of ideological agendas.  Orientalists sought to 
portray Ibn Khaldun as the “rationalist” exception to the “irrational” rule of 
Islamic culture.  Muslim modernists sought to present him as a Muslim source 
of western modernity, and even of dialectical materialism.  Arab nationalists 
have made him one of their symbols of “original” Arab rationalism, purified from 
what they see as the “corruption” of Persian “mysticism.”2   
 Any “native” aspiration to the pretense of “modernity” could not, of 
course, go without a good orientalist rebuttal, one of which was delivered by 
H.A.R. Gibb, in response, specifically, to Kamil Ayad and Erwin Rosenthal.  Of 
course, since the shape of the question is determined by the modernist fixation 
on the artificial “reason-religion” dichotomy, the discussion turns almost 
singularly on the question, as Gibb puts it, of “how far Ibn Khaldun deserves to 
be credited with the freedom from religious bias or pre-occupations which both 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Alatas, Syed Farid. Ibn Khaldun (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 
 105-116 
2 Zaidi, Ali. Islam, Modernity, and the Human Sciences (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2011). 
	  	  
these writers ascribe to him?”3  To support his claim, Gibb naturally needed to 
dismiss the evidence on offer, for Ibn Khaldun’s modernity and (presumably) 
therefore, his capacity for independent rational thought.   
 Here, the question of occasionalism takes a central role.  “His doctrine of 
causality and natural law, which in Dr. Ayad’s view stands in such sharp 
opposition to Muslim theological views,” Gibb declares, “is simply that of the 
sunnat Allah, so often appealed to in the Qur’an.”4  The underlying presumption 
seems to be that, to the extent that Ibn Khaldun makes any reference to sunnat 
Allah (“way of God;” i.e. the pattern of Divine will), he can thereby be exposed 
as someone essentially on the “belief” side of the “religion-belief” dichotomy to 
which the whole affair is reduced.  This dichotomy rests on the further 
presumption, that unless worldly phenomena are understood as completely 
unrelated to God, they must be absolutely unintelligible in natural terms.  As 
Aziz Al-Azmeh, in his extensive critique of Gibb, puts it, “the implication is that 
the notion of sunnat Allah, when invoked, magically works toward the 
eradication of natural causalities.”5  Understood without the imposed prism of 
the “reason-belief” dichotomy, Al-Azmeh asserts, the idea of sunnat Allah - or 
mustaqarr al-ʿāda (uniformity of custom) - carries no such implication. He writes, 
Occasionalism deals with the metaphysical structure of efficient 
causality and treats man within the context of an ontology of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Gibb, H.A.R. “The Islamic Background of Ibn Khaldun’s Political Theory,” Bulletin of the 
School of Oriental Studies, University of London. 7, No. 1 (1933): 23-31. 
4 Ibid.,” 23-31. 
5 Al-Azmeh, Aziz. Ibn Khaldun in Modern Scholarship: A Study in Orientalism (London: Third 
World Centre for Research and Publishing, 1981), 79-80. 
	  	  
created cause.  If this ontology were accepted, nothing would 
stand in the way of rationally elaborating the phenomenal 
existence of that which exists by virtue of this ontology, either 
logically or “religiously”…Causality is an epistemological entity, a 
judgment upon relations between things.  If such relations do not 
lend themselves to rational demonstration due to their ontological 
status, this should not mean that their ontological attributes cannot 
be bracketed and the relations given rational considerations in 
themselves, as in juridical judgments.6  
       
 Is this how Ibn Khaldun understood the matter?  From the vantage of 
occasionalism, the question is interesting for more than the vain concern over 
whether or not Ibn Khaldun was ‘truly’ modern.  For a perennial objection to 
occasionalism has been that it denies any real natural order, and therefore 
precludes the possibility of any systematic natural science.  If Ibn Khaldun was 
an occasionalist, then it would mean that one of the earliest pioneers in 
attempting to apply a systematic scientific method to the study of history and 
society did so on the basis of an occasionalist understanding of nature and 
natural order.  Then the question of whether and how his scientific methodology 
is compatible with occasionalism is of interest for both historical and theoretical 
reasons, in particular for theists who are exploring occasionalism as a potential 
framework for a coherent understanding of the natural world (including, in this 
case, its human and social dimensions) as both the manifestation of divine 
providence and creativity, and as an object of systematic empirical science.    
 In the Muqaddima, in the course of an account of dialectical theology 
(ʿilm al-kalam), Ibn Khaldun does express a theory of causation that is 	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effectively occasionalist, in that he prescribes a methodology of proceeding in 
the study of nature as if occasionalism is true, but which is indefinite as to 
whether he held to a thorough metaphysical occasionalism.  I will examine this 
account, and clarify some misunderstandings to show that there is no real 
conflict between such a position and his references to natural causality, properly 
understood.  Then, I will examine an argument, based on Ibn Khaldun’s own 
methodological prescriptions, that rebuts the case that Ibn Khaldun is an 
occasionalist.  Finally, I will attempt to resolve this tension by offering a reading 
of Ibn Khaldun as an occasionalist, which is compatible with a broadly realist 
position on the ontological status of universals, and arguing that consequently, 
his methodological references to the “nature” (ṭabiy’ah) and “essence” (jawhar) 
of civilization and historical events can be understood in a way that is coherent 
with this interpretation. 
 
  II. Ibn Khaldun on Causality 
 Henry Wolfson did a close study devoted almost solely to the section of 
the Muqaddima in which Ibn Khaldun deals with the issue of causality directly.  
As we will see, Wolfson may have been correct to interpret Ibn Khaldun, on the 
basis of this text, as an occasionalist.  But there is some confusion in his 
reading, stemming from certain mistakes the examination and correction of 
which will lead us to a clearer, more accurate picture of Ibn Khaldun’s 
understanding of causality.  This picture gives us reason to be more 
	  	  
circumspect, definitely concluding only that Ibn Khaldun understood 
occasionalism as possibly true, and that his position is methodologically 
occasionalist, in the sense that study of nature can only (and so should) 
proceed as if occasionalism were true.  But as for whether he positively adopts 
a thoroughly metaphysical occasionalist position, we can only conclude that this 
is possible.  That is, a coherent interpretation of Ibn Khaldun as an occasionalist 
is compatible with this textual evidence, but not exclusively so.   
 Wolfson’s analysis takes the following passage as its starting point:  
We say: It should be known that the things that come into being in 
the world of existing things, whether they belong to essences or to 
either human or animal actions, require appropriate causes which 
are prior to (their existence).  They introduce the things that come 
into being into the realm dominated by custom, and effect their 
coming into being.  Each one of these causes, in turn, comes into 
being and, thus, requires other causes.  Causes continue to follow 
upon causes in an ascending order, until they reach the Causer of 
causes, Him who brings them into existence and creates them.7  
 
 According to Wolfson, Ibn Khaldun’s statement, that causes “introduce 
things that come into being into the realm dominated by custom”, is actually a 
correction of what precedes it, and therefore an indication that, “Ibn Khaldun 
became conscious of a difficulty.”  The proof that Ibn Khaldun gives here, he 
claims, is the Aristotelian argument, leading to a God who is the remote Causer 
of causes, acting in the world only indirectly, through intermediate causes that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Ibn Khaldun. Muqaddima. Franz Rosenthal (trns.) and N.J. Dawood (ed.) (Princeton and 
Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2004), 348-349 
	  	  
constitute a “real causal nexus in the world.”8  But Ibn Khaldun “did not believe 
in causality.”  “To him the world was a succession of events, each of which was 
created directly by God,” explains Wolfson. “The sequence in this order of 
events which is observed is due to what the mutakallimūn (Islamic dialectical 
theologians) describe by the term “custom.” (ʿadah).”9  The difficulty, then, is 
reconciling a proof of God’s existence that is based on the premise that there 
are contingent causes (i.e. causes other than God), with a theological doctrine 
that there are none.   
 But is it correct to say that Ibn Khaldun “did not believe in causality?”  
The operative assumption, in Wolfson’s reading, is that if God creates each 
event directly, and the order between them is due to custom, then “disbelief in 
causality” follows; or as Wolfson puts it, there is no “real causal nexus in the 
world.”  Only then would it be necessary to understand Ibn Khaldun’s second 
statement about “custom” as a correction of the previous statement about 
causes.  But according to Wolfson, Ibn Khaldun’s correction here “may be taken 
as a general explanation of all other places where he speaks of “nexuses 
between causes and things caused” or of “the dependence of things upon each 
other,” so that “by all these expressions he means only a conception of 
causality due to “custom.”10  If this is so, then it would seem there is no real 
difference between “custom” and “cause” in Ibn Khaldun’s terminology.  And in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Wolfson, Harry A. “Ibn Khaldun on Attributes and Predestination,” Speculum 34 No. 4 
(1959): 586. 
9 Ibid., 586. 
10 Ibid., 586. 
	  	  
that case, there is no basis for the sort of difficulty Wolfson supposes Ibn 
Khaldun to have become aware of here.  The difficulty seems, instead, to be in 
Wolfson’s interpretation.      
 Wolfson supports his position with three key statements by Ibn Khaldun.  
One is that “thinking perceives the order that exists among things that come into 
being either by nature or by arbitrary arrangement.”11  The second is that 
causes “are only known through custom and through conclusions which attest 
to apparent relationship.”12  The third is that, “all these things are connected 
with the divine power.”13 The upshot of the first two, according to Wolfson, is 
that “it is our thinking that sees a causal nexus between things which we are 
accustomed to see following each other in ordered succession.”14  As for the 
third, Wolfson explains, “that is, all things which through “custom” are seen to 
be causally connected with each other are in reality connected with God as their 
cause.”15  Furthermore, this “custom”, according to Wolfson, is “our custom of 
forming a judgment” – a subjective mental habit.16  Wolfson’s interpretation, 
then, entails understanding the “order” among things that Ibn Khaldun mentions 
(which thinking perceives), as equivalent to a “casual nexus” that is not there, 
but is falsely projected onto things by our minds.  This has the consequence, of 
course, that the order among existing things is merely a mental projection.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Ibn Khaldun. Muqaddima. 334. 
12 Ibid., 349. 
13 Ibid., 334. 
14 Wolfson. “Ibn Khaldun on Attributes and Predestination,” 587. 
15 Ibid., 587. 
16 Ibid., 587. 
	  	  
 Besides the fact that two of the three statements he quotes are taken out 
of context, none of them remotely support such an interpretation.  Ibn Khaldun 
actually makes the first statement in explanation of why human actions are well 
ordered.  “This is because thinking perceives the order that exists among things 
that come into being either by nature or through arbitrary arrangement.”  
Nothing here lends itself to the idea that ‘thinking sees a causal nexus’ between 
things, which is not really there.  What Ibn Khaldun says, is that thinking 
perceives an order that exists among things.  Indeed, if taken in context, the 
immediate import of the surrounding text opposes rather than supports any 
“denial of causality.”  “When it intends to create something,” Ibn Khaldun writes, 
“it must understand the reason or cause of that thing, or the conditions 
governing it…”17 At any rate, his discussion here is about that which comes to 
be through human action, and not about the understanding of causality as such.  
When taken in context, the second statement Wolfson cites does pertain to that 
topic, but not in the way he claims. 
 “Furthermore, the way in which causes exercise their influence upon the 
majority of things caused is unknown,” Ibn Khaldun writes, “They are only 
known through customary (experience) and through conclusions which attest to 
(the existence of an) apparent (causal) relationship.”18  Here, we are actually 
told that causes are known.  They are known by inference on the basis of our 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Ibn Khaldun. Muqaddima, 334. 
18 Ibid., 349. 
	  	  
customary experience.  So Ibn Khaldun is not denying the existence of causes.  
Therefore, by “custom,” he does not mean a habit of forming fallacious causal 
judgments. The operative distinction here is not between “custom” and 
“causality”, but between causes, which are known, and “the way in which they 
exercise their influence.”  “What that influence really is and how it takes place is 
not known,” he writes, “Therefore, we have been commanded completely to 
abandon and suppress any speculation about them and to direct ourselves to 
the Causer of all causes, so that the soul will be firmly coloured with the 
oneness of God.”19   
 This certainly does provide strong evidence of Ibn Khaldun’s 
occasionalist sympathies, but it is a far cry from a kind of error theory, which 
conceives “cause” and “custom” as mutually exclusive terms in order to 
advance a position according to which the latter fools us into fallaciously 
inferring or projecting the presence of the former.  Wolfson, I think, is 
unconsciously imposing this modern interpretation of the Humean treatment of 
the “problem of causation” onto his reading of occasionalism.  This is a common 
mistake arising from superficial similarities between Hume’s empirical argument 
and the argument al-Ghazālī launched in Tahāfut al-Falāsifa (the Incoherence 
of the Philosophers).  But, as I have argued elsewhere, Humean skepticism and 
al-Ghazālī’s position are quite different and incompatible.20 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Ibid., 349. 
20  Moad, Edward Omar. “A Significant Difference Between al-Ghazali and Hume on 
Causation,” Journal of Islamic Philosophy 3 (2008): 22-39. 
	  	  
   If we take the statements Wolfson cites at face value, and in context, a 
somewhat different picture emerges.  The causal order is not, for Ibn Khaldun, 
something we simply impose onto experience through a habit of the mind.  
When he says, that “thinking perceives the order that exists among the things 
that come into being,” it is fairly clear here that he is taking it for granted, that 
there is an order existing among contingent things, and which can be grasped in 
thought.  “When it intends to create something,” he writes in the next line, “it 
must understand the reason or cause of that thing, or the conditions governing 
it, for the sake of the order that exists among the things that come into being.”21  
So, there are reasons, causes, and governing conditions of things that can be 
understood, and not just projected onto things by way of mental habit.  These 
are, “in general, the principles of that particular thing,” and “such a principle 
must have another principle to which its own existence is posterior.”22  This 
means that causes form a chain, which confirms that we are talking about 
contingent causes (that is, causes other than God).  “The degree to which a 
human being is able to establish an orderly causal chain determines his degree 
of humanity,” he then asserts.  “Some people are able to establish a causal 
nexus for two or three levels; some are not able to go beyond that.”23 Causes, 
causal chains, and causal nexuses, then, are not only real and comprehensible, 
but their comprehension is the unique excellence and very measure of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Ibn Khaldun. Muqaddima, 334. 
22 Ibid., 335. 
23 Ibid., 335. 
	  	  
humanity.  Furthermore, they are what Ibn Khaldun means by “the order” that 
thinking perceives among things.  
 Shortly thereafter, in Ibn Khaldun’s discussion of ʿilm al-kalām, we find 
the other key statements Wolfson refers to.  “As a rule, man is only able to 
comprehend the causes that are natural and obvious and that present 
themselves to our perception in an orderly and well-arranged manner,” he 
writes, “because nature is encompassed by the soul and on a lower level than 
it.”24 That is, the causes that we can comprehend are limited to those that are 
empirically perceivable through the apparent order and arrangement of natural 
phenomena.  As for their metaphysical dimension, it is beyond us.  
“Furthermore, the way in which causes exercise their influence upon the 
majority of things caused is not known, “he writes. “They are only known 
through custom, and through conclusions which attest to apparent 
relationship.” 25  “Custom,” then, is the empirically apparent order and 
arrangement of natural phenomena, within which we identify specific causal 
chains and causal relations.  Basically, “cause” for Ibn Khaldun means “custom” 
or “customary relationship.”  Perhaps in the interest of precision, we might 
suggest a definition of “causal nexus”, in this sense, as the following: an 
empirically perceivable relationship between natural events that is part of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Ibid., 349. 
25 Ibid., 349. 
	  	  
apparent order and arrangement of natural events - an instance of a constant 
conjunction or correlation apparent in empirical phenomena.  
 Thus, when Ibn Khaldun says that when thinking intends to create 
something, it must understand its reason or cause, he means that one must 
understand the empirically perceivable relations which that type of thing can be 
observed to customarily stand in with other types of things in the order and 
arrangement of phenomena.  When, in his discussion of kalām and his proofs 
for God’s existence, he asserts, “the things that come into being…require 
appropriate causes,” he means they must bear appropriate relations (that is, 
relations coherent with those, which other things of the same type have born) in 
the order of phenomena.  Their causes will be things of a type they have 
customarily been spatio-temporally correlated to in the appropriate way.  Such 
causes, “introduce the things that come into being into the realm dominated by 
custom.”26 That is, they provide a “place” – that is, a set of appropriate empirical 
relata – for the new thing or event, wherein it can fit coherently with the wider 
apparent phenomenal order.   
 The metaphysical question, as to what underwrites this phenomenal 
order, is not in Ibn Khaldun’s terms, a question about “causality” per se.  Thus, 
instead of distinguishing between “mere correlation” and “real causal nexus” as 
a Humean would do, Ibn Khaldun is distinguishing  between causes and “the 
way in which they exercise their influence.”  That is, whatever it might be (other 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Ibid., 349. 
	  	  
than God) in virtue of which natural phenomena are customarily ordered in 
causal chains and causal nexuses, is not knowable to us.  “What that influence 
really is and how it takes place is not known,” he writes. “Therefore, we have 
been commanded completely to abandon and suppress any speculation about 
them and to direct ourselves to the Causer of causes, so that the soul will be 
firmly coloured with the oneness of God.”27 What is being prohibited here, is not 
investigation into the “apparent and obvious” causal relations at the empirical, 
phenomenal level, but rather speculation as to any metaphysical structure 
beyond that, ostensibly explaining why, ultimately, phenomena are ordered in 
the way they are (i.e. in terms of “forms” or “essential natures” underwriting 
metaphysically necessary laws, etc.).  That is, not causes per se, but causes of 
causes.  However, it is not for once suggested that the ultimate reason for 
causal order in nature is unknown; much less that there is none whatsoever, or 
that the order there appears to be is mere appearance produced by mental 
habit.   
 On the contrary, God is the Causer of causes (musabbib al-asbāb).  
Importantly, this interpretation of Ibn Khaldun’s position forces us to understand 
his use of the term “cause” in two different senses.  The sense in which God is 
the Causer is ontological, and the sense in which the “causes” that He causes 
are “causes,” is phenomenal.  What is unknown is whether He causes these 
causes by way of metaphysical intermediaries.  Here, Ibn Khaldun does not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Ibid., 349. 
	  	  
straightforwardly deny these, but he does insist that they cannot be known.  So 
for him, the phenomenal order and its comprehensibility would be the same with 
or without the assumption of such intermediaries.  In this section of his text, 
then, matters appear to be very much in line with al-Azmeh’s understanding, 
cited above.  The question that remains, then, is whether this all establishes 
conclusively that Ibn Khaldun was an occasionalist, since he does not positively 
deny the existence of metaphysical intermediaries between God and the 
phenomenal order, and simply insists that the question is beyond our 
knowledge and that speculation over it is prohibited.  On the face of it, this 
seems to amount to nothing more than a kind of methodological occasionalism, 
whereby scientific inquiry proceeds on the basis of phenomenal causality alone, 
as if occasionalism is true, though we cannot positively know that it is.  
 The question, whether Ibn Khaldun’s position here amounts to a 
thoroughgoing positive occasionalism, can best be approached by first asking 
what would need to be the case (even if unknowably) for occasionalism to be 
false?  If the existence of phenomenal causal relations in nature does not 
violate the doctrine, then its falsification must require that something other than 
God be an efficient cause in the ontological sense.  Unfortunately, in order to 
ascertain whether Ibn Khaldun was positively an occasionalist we may have to 
jeopardize the colouring of our souls with the oneness of God.  Because the 
second question we have to ask is, of the “ways in which causes exercise their 
influence” - those “causes of causes” other than God, the existence of which Ibn 
	  	  
Khaldun seems to acknowledge as possible while denying our ability know: how 
are we to understand their hypothetical “causality”?  If Ibn Khaldun is to be 
understood positively as an occasionalist, then they cannot be understood as 
causal in the ontological sense.  On the other hand, they cannot be 
phenomenal, because ex hypothesis they are unobservable.         
 Ibn Khaldun has univocally asserted that God is the Causer of causes, 
but whether he could have positively held an occasionalist position depends on 
how he understood this.  Logically and historically, there are three basic 
options.  One position, currently known as “divine conservation”, is that 
creatures depend on God to sustain their continued existence.  The second, 
sometimes referred to as “continuous creation”, is that God continually re-
creates each thing at each moment of time. The third, associated much later 
with deism, is that creation depends on God only for its initial coming to be, after 
which it exists and operates causally on its own. The last is straightforwardly 
incompatible with occasionalism. The question is whether the first two do not 
entail occasionalism. They are equivalent inasmuch as they both entail that 
nothing exists independently of God. The question, then, is whether anything 
that does not exist independently can function as a cause in the ontological 
sense. If it can, then it must be such that some other thing depends on it to 
exist.  But if nothing exists independently of God, can anything depend on other 
than God for existence?  To me, the answer seems to be negative.  But highly 
	  	  
intelligent persons have thought otherwise.  So, I am not in a position to assert 
this as a given, nor is there space to engage the argument here. 
 It may well be that these are precisely the sort of questions which Ibn 
Khaldun asserts are beyond our ability to answer, in which case he cannot have 
positively either affirmed or denied an occasionalist position.  On the other 
hand, if he did hold the occasionalist doctrine then he could not have 
consistently held a deist understanding of divine causality.  But more 
specifically, he could not have understood any hypothetical, unobservable and 
unknowable causal intermediaries between God and phenomenal causes, as 
causal in either an ontological sense or a phenomenal sense.  So any 
interpretation of Ibn Khaldun as positively occasionalist faces the question, in 
what third sense might such possible intermediaries be understood as “causal,” 
and yet compatible with occasionalism? I will suggest an answer to this 
question in what follows.           
 
  III. Ibn Khaldun on philosophy and scientif ic method 
 But the section on ʿilm al-kalām by no means represents the sum of what 
deserves consideration.  Muhsin Mahdi has made a far more extensive case 
than either Gibb or Wolfson, for a very different reading of Ibn Khaldun.  For 
Mahdi, Ibn Khaldun is decidedly not an occasionalist.  Al-Azmeh criticizes 
Mahdi as vigorously, and on similar grounds on which he criticizes Gibb; that is, 
that Mahdi imposes the same “reason-belief” dichotomy, albeit to place Ibn 
	  	  
Khaldun firmly in the “reason” camp.  While this critique is valid, al-Azmeh 
overlooks another, philosophically more substantive dichotomy that seems to 
motivate Mahdi at least as much as the “reason-belief” dilemma, with which he 
prefaces his study of Ibn Khaldun, and to which he refers as a difference 
between the “ancients” and “moderns.” Mahdi writes, 
The issue between the ancients and the moderns seems to raise 
the deeper issue of the nature of scientific knowledge and of 
Being.  The ancients assert that behind the facts of history and 
experience there are universal and objective essences, natures, 
and causes, to which the concepts and judgments of the mind 
should correspond…The moderns start with the denial of objective 
essences, natures, and causes. Thus the horizon of the real is 
reduced to the facts of history and experience.  Science and 
philosophy, insofar as they venture beyond the facts of history and 
experience, are hypothetical constructions, which have no 
objective counterparts.28 
 
 For Mahdi, then, membership in the camp of “reason” is not identified 
simply as a kind of liberation from “belief” that culminates in modernity.  Rather, 
it has to do with a view of the nature of knowledge, which rests essentially on 
the ancient Greek realist position with regard to the ontological status of 
universals. The phenomenal order taken by itself, qua phenomena, is 
essentially historical in nature. Observation and experience is always of the 
past. The future is not observed. Thus, if the phenomenal is taken as the sum of 
what exists, then anything said (or thought) of the future is, as Mahdi puts it, 
mere hypothetical conjecture on the basis of the past, for which there is no real 
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object.  From the ancient Greek view of Plato and Aristotle, genuine knowledge 
is not just of how things have been, but is of why they have been that way.  But 
any answer to why they have been that way cannot be limited in reference to 
the historical, because that would ultimately amount to saying, that things have 
been the way they have been because they have been that way - which is no 
explanation at all.   
 So the possibility of genuine knowledge – the possibility of anything 
being intelligible – depends on the existence of some real object of reference 
that is not ultimately historical.  Phenomenal order is a pattern in the relations 
between particular things or events that are individuated from each other by 
space and time.  The intelligibility of this order must therefore rest in a unitary 
and unifying reality that operates in its determinative/explanatory function 
across (and is therefore, not bound by) space and time.  This is provided for in 
Greek thought by the hypothesis of objectively real universals (whether Platonic 
forms, or the formal dimension of substances in Aristotle’s hylomorphism), 
which inform historical phenomena with natures and essences that determine 
how (and therefore, explain why) individual things both have behaved in the 
way they have, and will behave in the way they will.  On this model, the ways 
things have changed and will change through time is a function of what they are 
– their essential, universal natures.  These are the proper objects of genuine 
knowledge through which, alone, spatio-temporal phenomena can be 
understood, to the extent that they can.  
	  	  
 With the move, in some modern philosophy, toward a more radical 
empiricism, and a consequently nominalist/conceptualist anti-realism about 
universals (the position that universals do not exist objectively, but are only 
subjective creatures of thought or language), this model is reversed.  The 
historical phenomena – how things have been observed to happen – is the 
ultimate objective reality, from which, what observed things are – any notion of a 
thing’s “nature” – is merely a theoretical construct with no referent in objective 
reality other than the ultimately contingent, observed historical phenomena.  
Science and philosophy, on this paradigm, cannot aspire to knowledge of why 
things have happened, and will continue to happen, in the way they have.  
Instead, we are limited to ever more systematic observations of how things 
have happened, and ever more probable (at best) predictions, on the basis of 
those observations, of how things will happen in the future.   
  The bulk of the Islamic falsafa tradition, under the influence of Plato and 
Aristotle, operated under what Mahdi is calling the “ancient” epistemological-
ontological paradigm.  For Mahdi, Ibn Khaldun’s unique intention and 
achievement was precisely to develop a science in answer to the question, how 
human history itself can be related, as an object, to this paradigm?  Al-Azmeh is 
correct in pointing out that Mahdi’s interpretation does involve an imposition of 
the “belief-reason” dichotomy - or as he puts it, understanding the central 
problem of Islamic thought as the relation between “Philosophy and The Law” – 
and that this forces him to explain away troublesome textual evidence 
	  	  
(including, perhaps, some of the section on ʿilm al-kalām discussed above), as a 
strategic maneuver in negotiating this relation.  But inasmuch as Mahdi bases 
his case on what he sees as the epistemological and metaphysical entailments 
of the methodology of Ibn Khaldun’s new historical science, it deserves to be 
considered on its own merits.          
 According to Mahdi, Ibn Khaldun’s methodology is thoroughly 
Aristotelian.  “Demonstrative reasoning, as expounded by Aristotle and the 
Muslim philosophers in their commentaries on Aristotle’s logical works, is the 
proper way to philosophic knowledge because it corresponds to, and abstracts 
the true nature of things,” he writes, “the proper method of philosophic 
investigation for Ibn Khaldun is, consequently, the material logic of Aristotle, the 
logic in which the nature of the mind meets the nature of the things 
investigated.”29  As a consequence, he asserts, Ibn Khaldun rejected what 
Mahdi refers to as “two major schools of logic” in the kalam.  He describes 
these as follows.  
The first was the attempt of the “ancients” [i.e. early mutakallimun] 
to reject en masse the basic metaphysical foundation of logical 
demonstration (i.e. their denial of the objective existence of 
essences and essential attributes) and to substitute for it an 
atomistic-occasionalistic universe in which all effects are the direct 
creation of God rather than the result of causes inherent in the 
nature of things.  This led them to the rejection of the objective 
existence of universals and to view universals and essences as 
purely mental constructions with no counterparts outside the mind. 
The second was the attempt of the “moderns” to follow the Stoics 
in their logical nominalism.  These writers did not study logic as a 	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tool of knowledge, but as an “art in itself”…They deserted 
Aristotle’s logical works that treated the content of reasoning and 
dealt exclusively with its form.30  
 
 There is, of course, a connection between the two “logical schools”, 
based on the premise that, rejecting the objective existence of universals 
amounts to rejecting the “metaphysical foundation of logical demonstration”, as 
Mahdi puts it.  Indeed, for Mahdi, occasionalism – or more specifically, any 
denial of Aristotelian metaphysics – has catastrophic epistemological 
consequences.  “The rejection of the quest for the nature of things by dialectical 
theologians,” he writes, “meant the rejection of the principle of causality as 
understood by Aristotle and Muslim philosophers.”31  But what he means to 
assert is the opposite – the rejection of the Aristotelian principle of causality 
entails abandoning the possibility of knowing the nature of things.  Mahdi makes 
clear what is at stake for him here: 
For the dialectical theologians, a causal relation is simply the 
customary relation between accidents, and not a certain and 
explanatory relation between objects arising from their very nature.  
Hence, the conception of what constitutes science underwent a 
basic change.  For the philosophers, science par excellence is the 
certain and explanatory knowledge of nature and causes; with 
certainty and explanation as inexorably related, and neither of 
them alone constituting science…The dialectical theologians, on 
the other hand, rejected the certainty of any explanation; for 
according to them, all explanations are only probable.32 
 
 Mahdi and al-Azmeh agree on this point: occasionalism rules out 
explanatory certainty in the natural sciences.  As al-Azmeh puts it: “If reality is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




occasionalistically structured, this implies that there is no mode of connection 
between things that can be demonstratively shown.”33  But Mahdi’s argument 
that Ibn Khaldun rejected occasionalism is based on this premise, along with 
the premise that Ibn Khaldun shared the “philosophical” aspiration for 
explanatory certainty, and the position that the Aristotelian scientific method 
renders it attainable.  Together, according to the argument, these entail his 
rejection of occasionalism.   
 But then, what of Ibn Khaldun’s extensive refutation of philosophy, which 
appears in the Muqaddima shortly after the discussion on ʿilm al-kalām?  
According to Mahdi, this refutation was only directed toward the Neo-Platonic 
tendencies of the Muslim “pretenders” to philosophy.  His theoretical objection 
to them was against their claim that divine beings can be known through 
reason, whereas Ibn Khaldun “upholds the Aristotelian-Averroistic doctrine that 
the essences of divine beings cannot be directly and fully comprehended by 
reason.”34 Thus, Ibn Khaldun’s refutation of philosophy is not, as it turns out, a 
refutation of philosophy, but rather a refutation of “false” philosophy; Ibn 
Khaldun being an adherent to the “genuine” philosophy of Aristotle and 
Averroes.  In line with this genuine philosophy, then, for Mahdi’s Ibn Khaldun, 
“the essences of physical beings can be comprehended because these beings 
can be perceived by the senses.”35  At this point it would be useful to note how 	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this process works, according to the theory.  “Starting from the sensible data of 
experience, it aims at the progressive abstraction of universals until it rests with 
the simple apprehension of essences,” Mahdi explains, “This ascending 
movement of thought to the supreme genera, or the most general properties of 
things, is then followed by a descending movement starting from universals and 
ending in affirmations about the essential attributes of things subsumed under 
these universals.”36  
 But taken at face value, Ibn Khaldun’s refutation of philosophy is not 
limited to rejecting the claim that divine beings can be known through reason.  
He also rejects the claim that the universal essences of sensible beings can be 
apprehended through abstraction, and therefore, that knowledge about the 
nature of sensible individuals can be arrived at through deduction from the 
apprehension of these universals.  “The arguments concerning the corporeal 
existents constitute what they call the science of physics,” he writes, “The 
insufficiency lies in the fact that conformity between the results of thinking - 
which as they assume are produced by rational norms and reasoning – and the 
outside world, is not unequivocal.” 37   That is, Ibn Khaldun’s refutation of 
philosophy is precisely that, contrary to the material logic of Aristotle, the nature 
of the mind does not meet the nature of the things investigated, as Mahdi put it.  
Consequently, the aspiration to explanatory certainty cannot be met, in the way 	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they claimed, even about the physical.  “At any rate, however, whatever 
(conformity) is attested by sensual perception, has its proof in the fact that it is 
observable, not in (logical) arguments,” Ibn Khaldun writes, “Where, then, is the 
unequivocal character they find in (their arguments)?”38      
 In his discussion on logic, we find Ibn Khaldun saying exactly what we 
would expect from the preceding.  “Thus as one has seen, the science (of logic) 
is not adequate to achieve the avowed intentions (of the philosophers),” he 
writes, “As far as we know, this science has only a single advantage, namely, it 
sharpens the mind in the orderly presentation of proofs and arguments, so that 
the habit of excellent and correct arguing is obtained.”39  Thus, for Ibn Khaldun, 
logic is not capable of apodictically comprehending the essential natures of 
things, and then arriving at certain knowledge about individual things by 
deduction from that.  However it is not completely useless.  Its usefulness lies in 
its allowing us to make reasonable inferences on the basis of information 
provided by the senses.  “They employ it a good deal in the physical and 
mathematical sciences, as well is in the science that comes after that,” Ibn 
Khaldun concludes, “Even if (those sciences) are not adequate to achieve the 
intentions of the (philosophers), they constitute the soundest norm of 
(philosophical) speculation that we know of.”40  Even the natural sciences, then, 
are not capable of achieving the absolute explanatory certainty hoped for by the 	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philosophers.  But with the application of the logical method of the philosophers, 
they are capable of a greater degree of explanatory probability than with any 
other known method.  All of this is connected, of course, with Ibn Khaldun’s 
treatment of causality, discussed above.  If the way in which phenomenal 
causes exercise their influence is beyond our knowledge, then this entails 
(indeed it is another way of saying) that the essential natures of physical things 
are not apodictically comprehensible through inferences made on the basis of 
empirical observation.       
  In the face of this, it seems the defender of Mahdi’s position would only 
have recourse to the hypothesis that Ibn Khaldun’s refutation of philosophy, 
along with his kalam discussion on causality (which makes the same 
epistemological point in other terms) do not represent his real position, but are a 
kind of lip service or strategic maneuver explained by the supposed need to 
negotiate the relation between ‘Philosophy and the Law.’  In the absence of 
actual textual evidence, this would amount to almost nothing more than 
unsupported assertion.  However, if an independent case can be made, based 
on the text, that the methodology Ibn Khaldun deploys in his own new science 
entails an embrace of the philosophical paradigm and a consequent rejection of 
occasionalism, then it would lend a great deal of plausibility to the position that 
what we find in the third-party discussion of philosophy and ʿilm al-kalām reflect 
less his own view than, perhaps, the requirements of the audience.  In fact, a 
fairly strong case can be made along these lines.    
	  	  
 On the first page of his Muqaddima, Ibn Khaldun tells us that history is 
rooted in philosophy, and deserves to be a branch of it.  So what does this 
mean?  If Mahdi is correct, then Ibn Khaldun means to prescribe a method of 
evaluating particular, historical reports against universal principles understood 
as necessarily governing all temporal events.  This not only presupposes that 
there are universal principles that necessarily govern the course of all temporal 
events (and which themselves are, consequently, timeless), but that these 
principles are discoverable.  Otherwise, of course, the notion of applying them 
to evaluate historical reports would be mute. 
 All of this appears in the process of Ibn Khaldun’s criticism of past 
historians’ uncritical reliance on historical reports in plain transmitted form.  
“They did not check them with the principles underlying such historical 
situations, nor did they compare them with similar material,” he writes, “Also, 
they did not probe with the yardstick of philosophy, with the help of knowledge 
of the nature of things, or with the help of speculation and historical insight.”41  
All the elements of Mahdi’s reading are present here.  The “principles 
underlying historical situations” are the timeless, universal principles necessarily 
governing temporal events.  This is the metaphysical presupposition of the 
method, expressed here as to “probe with the yardstick of philosophy”, which 
requires “the help of knowledge of the nature of things;” the epistemological 
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presupposition being that such knowledge is possible.  The argument for this 
interpretation follows. 
 First, Ibn Khaldun understands the validity of his methodology to rest on 
the fact that events across time are ultimately similar.  This comes out in the 
course of his discussion of the historian al-Mas’udi’s claim that the Israelite 
army of Moses numbered 600,000.  Ibn Khaldun claims that that is impossible 
because, “known customs and familiar conditions” prove that an army that size 
could not have been sustained by the available territory, and would be too large 
to march and fight as a unit. “The situation of the present day attests to the 
correctness of this statement,” he writes, “The past resembles the future more 
than one drop of water resembles another.”42  This last statement is crucial. Ibn 
Khaldun’s inference here is from the premise, that, under the familiar conditions 
of the present day, an army of that size would be impossible, to the conclusion, 
that in the past, armies of that size would also have been impossible.  And 
clearly, this inference is invalid without the additional premise that events across 
time are ultimately similar.  They “resemble each other more than one drop of 
water resembles another.” 
 Furthermore, this similarity of events across time is not to be understood 
as a brute accident, but as a consequence of their all being necessarily 
governed by similar, underlying universal principles.  This becomes clear if we 
compare Ibn Khaldun’s rather bold assertion about the resemblance between 	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the past and the future, with his warning against analogical reasoning in history.  
“A hidden pitfall in historiography,” he writes, “is disregard for the fact that 
conditions within nations and races change with the change of periods and the 
passage of time.”43     
Often, someone who has learned a good deal of past history 
remains unaware of the changes that conditions have undergone.  
Without a moment’s hesitation, he applies his knowledge (of the 
present) to historical information, and measures such information 
by the things he has observed with his own eyes, although the 
difference between the two is great.  Consequently, he falls into an 
abyss of error.44 
   
 On the face of it, we have what appears to be a direct contradiction. 
Here, we are told that conditions change over time.  There, we were told that 
conditions over time resemble each other more than drops of water.  The only 
way to reconcile this is to distinguish conditions that are subject to change from 
conditions that are not subject to change, basing the fallibility of analogy on the 
former and the credibility of Ibn Khaldun’s method on the latter.  And this is what 
Ibn Khaldun does.  “Every event, whether existence or action, must inevitably 
possess a nature peculiar to its essence as well as to the accidental conditions 
that may attach themselves to it,” he writes, “If the student knows the nature of 
events and the circumstances and requirements in the world of existence, it will 
help him to distinguish truth from untruth in investigating the historical 
information critically.”45 	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 Understood in straightforwardly Aristotelian terms, the “essence” of the 
event, is that without which a particular event would not be the kind of thing that 
it is.  While the individual thing itself (the “primary substance” in Aristotelian 
terminology) will change if it gains or loses features accidental to its essence, or 
cease to exist should it lose an essential feature; the essence itself – that is, 
what it is to be that kind of thing – is not subject to change.  For example, this 
tree will change, and even cease to exist when, for example, it is cut down and 
the wood is used to make a house; in which case it would lose the features that 
gave it unity in being a tree (that is, its “tree-ness”).  So, the individual tree itself 
is subject to change, but the essence peculiar to the nature of any tree (what it 
is to be a tree, or what “tree-ness” consists in) is a fixed and timeless reality – a 
“fact of the world of existence”, as opposed to a particular event in the history of 
this or that individual tree.  Generalizing, a nature peculiar to the essence of a 
thing is a set of principles that govern the temporal processes which it 
undergoes – that is, the ordered manner in which it changes – which follow from 
the kind of thing that it is, and which apply necessarily to anything of the same 
kind. 
 At any rate, when Ibn Khaldun refers to the “nature of events and the 
circumstances and requirements in the world of existence”, as a standard for 
the critical investigation of “historical information”, he is establishing a 
dichotomy between the two.  There is information that is historical, and that 
which is not.  This is necessary, because what we are after here is knowledge 
	  	  
that can be applied in critically evaluating historical information; and to use 
historical information to evaluate historical information would be to fall into the 
very fallacy of analogical reasoning that Ibn Khaldun warned against.  So the 
world of existence is distinguished here from the world of historical narrative, 
and knowledge of the former – knowledge of the principles of being – is made 
the measure of the latter.  Naturally, then, for Ibn Khaldun, distinguishing 
between the two is crucial.   
 “We must distinguish the conditions that attach themselves to the 
essence of civilization as required by its very nature; the things that are 
accidental and cannot be counted on; and the things that cannot possibly attach 
themselves to it,” he writes, “If we do that, we shall have a normative method for 
distinguishing right from wrong and truth from falsehood in historical information 
by means of a logical demonstration that admits of no doubts.”46  From this 
follows the epistemological implication of Ibn Khaldun’s method.  That is, that 
the timeless universal principles that necessarily govern all temporal events, 
and thus history itself, are discoverable, and therefore applicable as theoretical 
instruments for critically evaluating historical reports, in a way which avoids the 
pitfalls of analogical reasoning. 
 
  IV. Ibn Khaldun’s occasionalism between method and 
  metaphysics 	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 How, then, can we reconcile all this with Ibn Khaldun’s previously 
examined positions on causality and philosophical method?  Is it possible to do 
so without concluding, as Mahdi does, that Ibn Khaldun actually rejects 
occasionalism, and that these positions do not, therefore, reflect his true views?  
This depends on whether Ibn Khaldun’s references, here, to “principles 
underlying historical events”, “essences”, “natures”, “facts of existence”, and the 
like, can be plausibly understood in a way which is compatible with his positions 
there, and with occasionalism, generally.  Here, we face a challenge which does 
not present itself to the prospect of the occasionalist interpretation of the causal 
language described earlier by al-Azmeh and discovered in our examination of 
Ibn Khaldun’s discussion of ʿilm al-kalām.   
 A feature of the phenomenal interpretation of causal language discussed 
there, is that it does not (in Mahdi’s terms) “venture beyond the facts of history 
and experience,” except in the form of “hypothetical constructions which have 
no objective counterparts.”  Thus, one of al-Azmeh’s key statements in this 
respect (cited above), could be re-written to read: “If this (occasionalist) 
ontology were accepted, nothing would stand in the way of rationally elaborating 
the phenomenal existence of that which has existed (rather than “exists”) by 
virtue of this ontology.”  Or more precisely, the two versions would be equivalent 
(“exists” = “has existed”) because on a strictly phenomenal interpretation of 
causal language, (again, in Mahdi’s terms) “the horizon of the real is reduced to 
the facts of history and experience.”  But it has been made clear that the 
	  	  
expressed aspirations of Ibn Khaldun’s intended method presuppose and 
require, that the genuine facts of history and experience are to be sifted from 
historical narrative by means of the “yardstick of philosophy;” i.e. “facts of 
existence” which lie beyond the horizon of time and history.  These facts come 
in the form of objectively existing universals (natures, essences, and the like).  
This problem has a metaphysical and an epistemological dimension, each of 
which we will treat separately. 
 Mahdi, above, described the “ancient” mutakallimūn as rejecting “the 
metaphysical basis of logical demonstration” by holding that “all effects are the 
direct creation of God rather than the results of causes inherent in the nature of 
things,” because this doctrine “led them to the rejection of the objective 
existence of universals and to view universals and essences as purely mental 
constructions with no counterparts outside the mind.”  First, we should concede 
that Mahdi is correct in viewing the objective existence of universals as the 
metaphysical basis of the possibility of logical demonstration, insofar as this 
leads, in the sense explained above, to explanatory certainty regarding natural 
phenomena.  Then putting aside the historical question about the views of the 
mutakillimūn, let us take the simple proposition that “all effects are the direct 
creation of God” as an adequate statement of occasionalism as such.  This 
being established, the remaining question is whether this position entails the 
rejection of the objective existence of universals, and the conclusion that these 
are purely mental constructs with no counterparts outside the mind? 
	  	  
 I think this is not the case.  Rather, as we saw above, all that 
occasionalism entails is rejection of the independent existence of universals, 
along with the notion of their having any causal capacity in the ontological 
sense.  Universals can exist objectively, as eternal objects of Divine Will and 
Knowledge, without thereby existing independently.  That is, on the premise that 
God is timelessly eternal, history is not the horizon of the real - the past is not all 
that exists. Thus, there can be an objectively existing, divinely ordained fact that 
natural events occur in a certain divinely ordained pattern across all of time and 
space; a “fact of existence”, as Ibn Khaldun calls it, which is not just the 
essentially historical fact that events have (or have been observed to) occur in 
that pattern in the past.  That would be a fact of universal scope, binding the 
future and past together under a timeless reality, and which is not just a purely 
hypothetical or mental construction.  It meets the metaphysical conditions 
required for the possibility of logical demonstration as applied to nature.  Yet it 
remains a Divine act and not an independently existing determinant of Divine 
will, and so does not violate the essential point of occasionalism.   
 Above, we noted that any occasionalist interpretation of Ibn Khaldun’s 
section on ʿilm al-kalām would have to face the question about the causal 
intermediaries, which he acknowledges as possible, between God and 
phenomenal causes: since they can be neither ontological nor phenomenal, in 
what sense are they “causal”?  This interpretation of his reference to objectively 
real universals furnishes a possible answer.  If universals are understood in this 
	  	  
way, as the content of an eternal divine decree, then their function is similar to 
that of phenomenal causes in that they constitute a relation of unity between 
spatio-temporally distinct events, without operating causally in an ontological 
sense (that is, nothing depends on them for existence).  Yet, they are different 
from phenomenal causes in that they are not observable.  Of course, this raises 
notoriously difficult philosophical questions about the relationship between the 
timelessly eternal and the temporal, but these questions apply to any form of 
realism about universals or necessary laws of nature, and so are not unique to 
occasionalism. The point here is just that realism about universals can be made 
compatible with occasionalism, and remain robust enough to metaphysically 
underwrite the possibility of explanatory certainty of the sort at which Ibn 
Khladun’s method appears to aim. 
 On the epistemological side of the problem things are quite different, at 
least in light both of Ibn Khaldun’s refutation of philosophy, and his insistence in 
the section on ʿilm al-kalām that any non-phenomenal “causes of causes” other 
than God cannot be known.  As we saw, an epistemological presupposition of 
the method he prescribes seems to be, not just that universals objectively exist, 
but that they are discoverable as such.  The only thing that distinguishes his 
method from that of mere analogy, is that on his method, inferences are 
supposedly premised on “conditions that attach themselves to the essence of 
civilization by reason of its very nature;” where, in the case of analogy, 
inferences are fallaciously premised on conditions that are merely contingent 
	  	  
and change over time.  Yet Ibn Khaldun’s objection to philosophy, as we saw, 
was just that any conformity, between the natural world and our concepts 
thereof, is attested by observation alone and not by logic.  Consequently, to the 
extent that such concepts “venture beyond” history and experience, it can only 
be as hypothetical construction, and not as the apprehension of anything 
objective beyond the temporal horizon.  Such hypothetical constructions about 
natural laws binding on future events will be invariably based on observations of 
the past.  For this reason, Al-Azmeh argues that Ibn Khaldun’s methodology is 
essentially analogical, though Ibn Khaldun leaves the strong impression of 
having advertised it as something more.47   
 But recall Ibn Khaldun’s statement, cited above, that, “even if (those 
sciences) are not adequate to achieve the intentions of the (philosophers), they 
constitute the soundest norm of (philosophical) speculation that we know of.”  
This appears to acknowledge that, even though we can never reach the 
philosophers’ goal of explanatory certainty, there are yet, between exercises in 
analogy, greater and lesser approximations of that goal to be had.  Thus, the 
way is open for understanding Ibn Khaldun as using the philosophical model of 
logical demonstration as more of an ideal by which to measure the relative 
quality of the analogical inferences to which we are, in fact, limited.  That is, we 
may never be able to apodictically identify what attaches to the very essence of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Al-Azmeh, Aziz. Ibn Khaldun: An Essay in Reinterpretation (London: Frank Cass, 1982), 
121-135. 
	  	  
civilization by reason of its nature, because our concepts of civilization (and of 
nature, generally) are limited to that which can be attested to by observation, 
and therefore, to civilization under the limited conditions of history and 
experience available to us.  However, we can certainly be aware of the relative 
degree to which certain sorts of historical conditions have been observed to 
change, as compared to others.   
 That is, experience presents us with degrees of contingency.  So those 
conditions of civilization which have the most general applicability in history and 
experience, or conditions of a sort which simply have never been observed to 
change, certainly approximate a hypothesized essence of civilization, better 
than do those of a sort that have been observed to change more frequently.  
Reference to “essences” and “natures” might play the role, for Ibn Khaldun, of 
epistemological ideals, which though actually unattainable, effectively guide the 
natural scientist, methodologically, toward greater degrees of explanatory 
probability.  It is important to remember that, in this context especially, 
philosophical justification for the objective existence of universals does not 
depend on our being able to actually apprehend them.  Their existence follows, 
quite arguably, from the combination of divine providence and divine eternity.  In 
other words, though we may be only capable of hypothetical constructions on 
the basis of past observation, these constructions are not altogether without any 
objective counterparts.  There are timeless universal truths, enacted by God’s 
eternal will.  Therefore, even if we cannot apprehend the essential natures of 
	  	  
things directly, we still have reason to believe that such things exist (objectively, 
if not independently), and can then plausibly suppose that by searching for 
those conditions that are attached to civilization most generally, we can form a 
concept that at least approximates its essential nature to a greater rather than 
lesser degree.  And on this basis, we can draw analogical inferences with a 
higher probability of truth, than otherwise.  This reading of Ibn Khaldun’s 
epistemology is both consistent with his refutation of philosophy, and 
compatible with occasionalist interpretation of his account of ʿilm al-kalām. 
 To conclude, in the course of this chapter we have seen that, in his 
Muqaddima, Ibn Khaldun expresses a methodologically occasionalist position.  
Secondly, we have shown how his references to natural causation and 
objectively real universals can be understood in a way that is compatible with a 
positive occasionalism.  Finally, we outlined a plausible reading of the 
epistemological role that Ibn Khaldun intends for these universals in his 
methodology, which is compatible with both occasionalism and his refutation of 
philosophy.  Along the way, we have, perhaps, laid out some starting points for 
discussing a comprehensive framework within which to theorize the relationship 
between an occasionalist ontology and a philosophy of the natural and social 
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